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Law and Public Policy Environmental Law discussion at the 2008
National Lawyer's Convention. The panelists spoke in Washington, DC
on November 20,2008. The views and opinions expressed are solely those
of the panelists and do reflect those of the Federalist Society or the
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review.
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Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
PANELISTS:
Prof. Jonathan Adler, Case Western Reserve University School of Law
Prof. John C. Dernbach, Widener University Law School
Dr. Steven F. Hayward, American Enterprise Institute
Prof. Jeremy A. Rabkin, George Mason University School of Law
HON. JEFFREY S. SUTTON
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, SIXTH CIRCUIT
We've got a lot to talk about, and I want to make sure we have
enough time for the questions and answers. My name is Jeff Sutton. I'm
a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit based in Cincinnati.
I live in Columbus, Ohio. You may have noticed the title for our session
today is the policy implications of the reaction to climate change. That's
an extravagantly vague title that will pick up an extravagantly broad
range of topics. We've got the Kyoto Protocol, whether it's still relevant
or not. We've got the various roles of the states, state agencies, the federal
government, the federal agencies, and the international community in
enforcing all of these laws. We've got the role of the courts in refereeing
* Each speaker was provided a copy of the transcript prior to publication and offered an
opportunity to make minor edits. Any paragraphs with changes beyond minor edits have
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these disputes. And perhaps the real elephant in the room is what the new
administration can meaningfully do in this economic climate.... We've
got a first-class group of speakers here to walk us through these topics.
As is typical with these sessions, we'll have roughly eight- to ten-minute
presentations.
I'm going to introduce our speakers in the order in which they will
be speaking. The first is Steven Hayward, the Weyerhaeuser Fellow in
Law and Economics at the American Enterprise Institute. He's the co-
author ofAEI's Environmental Policy Outlook, the principal author of the
Annual Index of Leading Environmental Indicators, and the author of four
books on politics and the presidency, including Air Quality in America.
Our next speaker will be John Dernbach, distinguished professor
of law at Widener University in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. John teaches
environmental law, property law, and international law. He co-authored
an amicus brief on behalf of 18 climate scientists in the Massachusetts v.
EPA U.S. Supreme Court case. He's a 1978 Michigan Law School
graduate. John's also got a state perspective because, before teaching, he
worked at the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection.
Our third speaker will be Jonathan Adler, professor of law and
director of the Center for Business Law and Regulation at Case Western.
He's an author and editor of three books on environmental law, and a
prolific contributor to the Volokh Conspiracy and the National Review
Online. He also authored an amicus brief in the Massachusetts v. EPA case.
And our fourth speaker is Jeremy Rabkin, who teaches interna-
tional law at George Mason University Law School. Much of his recent
scholarship analyzes emerging conflicts between international law and
traditional notions of national sovereignty. He serves on the Board of
Academic Advisors of the AEI and the Board of Directors of the U.S.
Institute of Peace.
DR. STEVEN F. HAYWARD
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Well, thank you, Judge Sutton. Good afternoon everyone. I am not
a lawyer, and I don't even play one on TV. I'm going to try and set the
scene with some old-fashioned policy wonkery. It's considered d6class6
and it's not the subject of our panel this afternoon to be openly skeptical
about catastrophic global warming, so I won't do that, but I will do
something nearly as bad. I'm going to stick with the nearly equal heresy
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of disputing that rapid or steep reductions in greenhouse gas emissions
are the path of supreme virtue and the primary policy to be pursued, even
in the face of prospectively significant climate change.
My thesis is that the rigors of what I call environmental correct-
ness and the prolonged and solemn farce of the Kyoto process are
generating the greatest mass hypocrisy since perhaps the Kellogg-Briand
Pact promised to end warfare in 1928, or as I often put it in just the
American context, I'm pretty confident that within ten or twenty years-it
might even be ten or twenty months-we're going to look back on the
Kyoto process as the climate policy equivalent of wage and price controls
to fight inflation in the '70s. My corollary is the traditional regulatory tools
in environmental policy are not even the right framework for addressing
this problem, even in its most severe prospective dimensions.
So, even as President-Elect Obama promises to get with the
program that Bush has neglected for the last eight years, the scene in
Europe right now is one of national governments looking for the exits from
their grand rhetoric.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel last week reiterated the
necessity of EU member states agreeing to ambitious targets for the year
2020 but said at the same time that there must be exemptions for key
German industries. Two days ago, she said, "Emissions reductions must
be taken in such a way as to not weigh on industry."
(Laughter.)
In other words, reductions have to be costless.
(Laughter.)
One sees the obvious parallel to the long-suffering trade liberaliza-
tion talks in which European Union nations pay lip service to free trade,
even as they increase their own agricultural subsidies and trade barriers.
In Australia, the ruling Labour Party, which made fealty to the
Kyoto process one of its key campaign promises a year ago, is now splitting
badly over their proposed emissions trading program. The new govern-
ment in New Zealand has ordered a top-to-bottom review of its emissions
trading scheme, and that's a signal that they're either going to scale it
back or abandon it entirely. Canada's backing away from its proposed
carbon tax. Two weeks ago, the Chair of the California Air Resources Board,
Mary Nichols, who I can tell you is no shrinking violet when it comes to
extending new regulations, said she was "thinking of punting" on the details
of an emissions trading scheme for California that is supposed to begin
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operating in the year 2012. And if you go over to Japan, whose economy is
more than twice as energy efficient on energy use per dollar of GDP as the
United States, their greenhouse gas emissions have risen 9% since 1990
with a fairly flat economy and virtually no population growth.
I could go on in this vein, and I interpret all of this as signs of
evidence that the air is starting to leak out of the climate change bubble,
the successor to the internet bubble and the housing bubble. Even Al Gore
is slightly changing his tune if you paid close attention to his article in
the New York Times the day after the election. Now, all this was utterly
predictable. In fact, the template for the unfolding of this issue was laid
out thirty-five years ago by political scientist Anthony Downs's famous
article on the issue attention cycle, where he talks about how we get
euphoric and excited about a new crisis because the euphoria comes from
the opportunity to save the world with transformative action.
And then the key step, the third one, is reckoning with the serious
costs involved and then declining public interest. We've seen the cycle with
the population bomb of the late '60s and early '70s and with the resource
exhaustion panics of the 1970s and so forth. This time, I think the green
crusaders have bit off more than they can chew, and to mix references,
they're calling for a transformation of the world's economy so sweeping
and unrealistic that it would make King Canute blush. The target that
Barack Obama has embraced-and John McCain wasn't that far behind,
so I don't want to be picking on him-was that we need to reduce our
greenhouse gas emissions by 80%, eight-zero percent, by the year 2050
from the 1990 baseline, which is significant.
Well, what does this mean in real terms? I mean, it's easy to throw
around percentages and it's easy to throw around large numbers like 6
billion tons of carbon dioxide emissions a year, which is about our level
in round numbers in the United States. If you take an 80% reduction from
1990 levels, it means by the year 2050 we have to get down to about 1
billion tons of carbon dioxide emissions. When was the last time the
United States had emissions at that level? Well, if you look at Department
of Energy historic tables, it turns out we were at that level of emissions
at about the year 1910, a hundred years ago, when the country had 92
million people and per capita income in current dollars was about $6000.
In the year 2050, we'll have 420 million people, which means on
a per capita basis, we will have to have an emissions profile much lower
than our great grandfathers had in 1910. In fact, to meet the 80 by '50
target, per capita emissions can be no more than 2.5 tons per person.
Question: Anybody know what nations in the world right now have
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emissions at that level? Well, it's, you know, garden spots like Haiti,
Somalia, Jordan-poor, undeveloped countries. It's possible that the U.S.
never emitted at that low a level even when we just burned wood and
whale oil in our lamps.
The lowest industrialized nations' emissions profile right now are
France and Switzerland. They're the very best. France, of course, gets 80%
of its electricity from nuclear power. It's a small, compact country. People
don't have to drive very far. You don't have to ship goods very far. They
emit 6.5 tons per capita, right now, of CO 2. Switzerland is actually a little
better. They get almost all their power from nuclear or hydropower, the
other form of non-emitting power that our environmentalists don't like,
and they emit about 6.2 tons per capita. So even if the U.S. were to match
the French and Swiss performance, which, given our geography, is
probably not possible under our current energy system, we'd still be way,
way, way above the 2050 target.
I'll give youjust one more example. The Energy Department breaks
up emissions by sector. If the household sector in 2050, when we'll have
forty million more households than today, is to stay with roughly it's the
same share of the emissions it has today, then the household sector can
account for no more than about 205 million tons of CO 2.Right now today,
emissions from natural gas use from our household sector, just natural
gas in our ovens and our furnaces is 237 million tons. That doesn't count
a watt of electricity generated by coal or natural gas or anything. So, right
now today, our household sector is, 30, 40% above where it has to be. In
forty years, we're going to have forty million more households.
Are we really to retrofit the existing housing stock completely with
all-electric appliances generated by, what, windmills, because we can't
have coal? That's not going to work. You could replace every single coal-
fired power plant with natural gas and still be more than twice as high
as the 80 by '50 target. I can go on about this. I've done a great deal of
analysis on how this all works and can bore you to death. I'm going to skip
over a lot on this.
I sometimes ask people at the Department of Energy or in the
European energy agencies-you know, both our energy department and
the International Energy Agency, they have projections of greenhouse gas
emissions based on energy use, and they all go up like this. And the 80
by '50 targets says we're going to go like that. And I ask them, do you sort
of look at these targets and close your door and giggle? And they say, yeah,
that's pretty much what we do.
(Laughter.)
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DR. HAYWARD
There are two energy economists at Princeton, Robert Sokolow and
Steven Pacala. They have a plan that would hold our emissions flat by
the year 2050, including a whole lot of things such as nuclear power
plants, which may or may not be feasible and affordable for lots of reasons,
and it's hard to know what a lot of these new technologies would cost, like
concentrated solar, but one estimate is that would be about six trillion
dollars to stay flat by the year 2050.
Now very quickly since I'm almost out of time, what are the
alternatives? One is, we need to have some energy breakthroughs. New
energy has to be cheaper than what we have today. If it's more expensive,
that's not going to work because developing nations aren't going to buy
it. It's hard to say that in twenty or thirty years we're not going to see
some, so you don't want to be a complete naysayer on that, but that's a
tough problem. Second one, one the IPCC has endorsed but everyone
ignores, is adaptation. Jonathan Adler has written some good, detailed
papers on what you would do in areas of water, for example, in the West.
Finally, the one I think that we're going to move to by force of gravity is
what's called geoengineering. To make a long story short, it's build some
artificial sun shades. There's been a lot of scientific interest in this. The
Royal Academy of Sciences in Britain is launching a big project on it. It's
very controversial because it's not environmentally correct. When NASA
proposed to hold a workshop on this two years ago, they had shouting
matches in the hallway. Don't ever let someone say that there's no politics
in science, right?
Now, the science is actually easier than the politics and the law.
One problem with this idea is that anybody could do it. China could decide
in twenty years that they want to put sulfate emissions in the high
altitude to deflect solar radiation, and there may or may not be existing
law. Some of the UN treaties on manipulating the environment for hostile
purposes may apply, there's going to need to be some new international
law if this idea is to be developed. You know, Russia might well think that
it would be a hostile act to cool off the northern hemisphere. They're one
of the big winners from global warming, right? Canada might feel the
same way. So this is a political and legal problem.
And I will stop there, fifteen seconds over time, so I don't get
sanctioned by the judge.
(Applause.)
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PROF. JOHN C. DERNBACH
WIDENER UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL
Good afternoon, and thank you all. When I was in fifth grade, I
read one of those little books about World War II that were available in
the early 1960s. It was about the Seabees. The Seabees were the Naval
amphibious engineers who provided a lot of support for the island hopping
campaign for the U.S. military as it moved toward Japan in the Pacific
during World War II. Their motto was "can do." An officer would say, "We
need an amphibious bridge built across this 600-yard strait by tomorrow
morning. Can you do that, Lieutenant?" The response invariably was, "Yes
sir, can do."
Russell Baker wrote a column about the Seabees in 1970, as the
Clean Air Act was being discussed in Congress. I've kept this column for
years, and today the column seems very timely. He compared the Seabees
with the U.S. automakers at the time. He said that the position that the
automakers were taking on pollution control was "can't do."
We are now confronted with enormous scientific consensus that
there is a substantial risk of very negative impacts from climate change
to the United States and the rest of the world. What should the position
of the United States be? The question I would put before you today as
Americans, in responding to this issue, is this: Are we a can-do or a
can't-do people?
I want to go back to the amicus brief that was referred to. I was
privileged to be part of the legal team that represented eighteen
prominent climate scientists. And apart from all the legal issues, the thing
that really impressed me was that the scientists themselves are surprised
by how fast climate change is unfolding. They said they always knew the
basic atmospheric physics-if you put more greenhouse gases into the
atmosphere, that increases pressure for warming in the atmosphere. So
the atmosphere is going to warm and sea levels are going to rise. But, they
said, they didn't expect to see actual climate change in their lifetime. And
the picture they painted with that this is all unfolding very fast.
Climate change is not just an environmental issue; it is a
sustainable development issue. At the Earth Summit in 1992, the nations
of the world, including the United States under the first President Bush,
signed on to nonbinding agreements to achieve sustainable development.
Sustainable development would have us take the environment, economic
development, social well-being, and security, and have them all work
together. For most of my life, by contrast, we've treated environmental
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degradation as the price of progress in all these other dimensions-social,
economic and security. Sustainable development would also have us work
for human quality of life, human freedom and human opportunity-the
same goals as the traditional development model.
People all over the world are experiencing real problems because
of climate change. And the overwhelming number of those people and the
most severe impacts are being felt in developing countries, whether it's
droughts or challenges with water supplies. The most recent reports to
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change aren't about the models
anymore. They're all about observed effects. The debate has changed a
lot in that regard.
I know how much the moral and ethical piece of your lives means
to the members of this Society. And I would assert to you, in no uncertain
terms, with 100% confidence, that climate change is not just a policy issue
and it's not just a legal issue; it's a moral issue and it's an ethical issue.
About 25% of historic greenhouse gas emissions that are in the atmo-
sphere now are due to the United States. We're not responsible for all of
it, but we can't say, well, that doesn't have anything to do with us. The
moral and the ethical dimension works out in many ways. What does the
United States do when we're contributing to problems that are being
experienced right now in developing countries? What do we do when some
of the impacts are being felt in our own country? What we do when there's
a very high level of certainty that a great many property owners,
particularly in coastal areas, are going to have their property values and
their freedom to use and enjoy their property compromised by rising sea
levels and stronger storm surges?
So my perspective is based on a respect for the science and a re-
spect for the moral and ethical and even religious dimension of climate
change.
There are dumb ways to deal with climate change and there are
smart ways to deal with climate change, just like there are dumb ways
to plan your life and smart ways to plan your life. We need to look really
hard at what makes sense from the standpoint of creating jobs, advancing
technology, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, reducing the emission of
other air pollutants, and making ourselves more secure. In other words,
we need to do sustainable development.
About 80% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions-actually, the
number's probably a little higher-are from the burning of fossil fuels.
I was just at a conference in Sacramento a couple of days ago, where
somebody had run the numbers. He said you can get way more out of
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efficiency and conservation with existing off-the-shelf technologies than
you can get with nuclear power or with wind or with any of the rest.
As you can probably guess, there's no magic bullet to seizing the
opportunities of efficiency and conservation. The cap and trade legislation
that's in front of Congress now probably won't do the trick on efficiency
and conservation by itself. As Robert Stavins has pointed out, cap and
trade alone doesn't do a good job of getting to energy efficiency. The price
signals are often sent to the wrong people, as in landlord-tenant
situations, for example. And even now there are cost-effective energy
efficiency opportunities that people don't take advantage of. Why would
that change under cap and trade?
So, putting together a portfolio of measures, whether it is in
climate change legislation or in energy efficiency and conservation
legislation, is probably the thing to do. There's a huge amount of energy
savings, greenhouse gas reduction, and job creation that we could get with
a really big program to renovate and upgrade existing residential and
commercial structures. Something like 30 to 40% of U.S. energy
consumption comes from existing buildings. And there are many other
efficiency and conservation opportunities. Take traffic lights. You've been
in traffic in cities, where you wait a minute at a traffic light and it turns
green, and you go to the next block and it's red again, and wait another
minute, and then you go to the next light two blocks away and it's red
again. Imagine a world in which the traffic lights are all synchronized.
The technical people who have done the modeling say that we could get
considerable energy savings if we had a national effort to synchronize
traffic lights. There are dozens and dozens of these kinds of opportunities,
if we just look for them.
No one in this room thinks that the economic situation that we're
in is a good one. The question whether we can afford climate change is
based on the argument that it is going to have to cost more. The premise
of sustainable development is that if we invest not just with the economy
in mind, but with the environment in mind, with jobs and technology and
security in mind, we actually get more benefits than if we're not thinking
about them at all. And that's really my message here. There's a way to
do this. We need to do it.
Thank you so much.
(Applause.)
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PROF. JONATHAN ADLER
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Thank you. It's a pleasure to be back. I want to step back a little bit
from talking about what we should do or shouldn't do in the context of
climate change and spend a little bit of time talking about what, whether
we like it or not, we are committed to doing-what, under current law at
the federal level, we have to do if we just sit and watch the climate policy
train keep going. Because the reality is whatever we think we should be
doing with climate change and however much we think it is or is not a
problem-whether we think the goal should be emission reductions,
adaptation, geo-engineering or whatever else-legally, we are committed
to doing a lot, and it's not going to be pretty. And I think that changes the
calculus in some important ways in talking about climate change policy and
the various climate policy options that we have. Obviously, the current
financial situation changes some of those calculations even more.
So, what I want to do initially is talk about what we are doing or
are going to have to do, like it or not, if there's not legislative change. Then
if I have time, I'll say a little bit about some alternatives that we may need
to put on the table. The short hand of what I'm going to tell you is that
a lot of the emission reduction policies that are on the table may be a
really bad idea. In fact, I think many of them are. But as, unfortunately,
is so often the case, it's the law.
The first place to start is the Supreme Court's decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA. I don't think we need to spend a lot of time talking
about what happened in that case. Basically, the Supreme Court was
forced to answer a handful of questions, the most important being whether
or not the Clean Air Act authorizes the regulation of greenhouse gases
for motor vehicles. I submitted a brief saying that no, it did not, and
further arguing that the petitioners should not have standing because
even accepting their own scientific estimates, the most they could assert
as the injury that they complained of, and that could be redressed, was
less than an inch of sea level rise over the next hundred years. But we lost
those points, and the Supreme Court concluded that the Clean Air Act,
whether it was intended to or not, did authorize the regulation of
greenhouse gases. And although I admit that the decision itself did not
say it, the reality is that the Massachusetts v. EPA decision effectively
requires the regulation of greenhouse gases.
The standard in the Clean Air Act is that if the administrator could
reasonably conclude that the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the
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atmosphere could reasonably be anticipated to adversely affect the public
health or welfare, then greenhouse gases must be regulated under various
provisions of the Act. The reality is the Environmental Protection Agency
has for years, under the Bush administration, under the. Clinton
administration, in official documents and unofficial documents, even in
the original Federal Register notice, in which it initially denied the
authority to regulate greenhouse gases, has effectively said that the
accumulation of greenhouse gases can reasonably be anticipated to
adversely affect the public health and welfare. It didn't use the magic
words of an endangerment finding, but the EPA's position now of not
simply having to make an initial determination about the effects of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, it's actually in the position of having
to deny all the things that it has said on top of the things that the
National Academy of Sciences has said, the IPCC has said, and so on.
So, even if one believes that the scientific evidence is more
equivocal than the official "consensus," that's not the position the EPA
has taken in the Federal Register and in other documents. Given that I
don't think there is any way at this point that the EPA could plausibly
argue that the accumulation of greenhouse gases do not satisfy what is
necessary for an endangerment finding, and therefore it must regulate.
Now, Massachusetts v. EPA only concerns Section 202 of the Act,
which deals with new motor vehicles, so that's the first part that we get.
And that's what the Bush administration's advance notice of proposed
rulemaking that they dropped a few months ago at least initially
addressed. This was something like a 500-page document in the Federal
Register where the Bush administration basically said regulating
greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act is really crazy. It will make a
mess. It will grind administration of this Act to a halt. It will impose
tremendous costs with minimal benefits. I think on all those points, the
Bush administration was correct. The Bush administration then said,
'Well, what do we do about it?' and effectively kicked the can down the
road so that the next administration could deal with it.
But we know what they have to do. They have to issue standards
under Section 202 for motor vehicles. They have to issue standards under
the provisions relating to other types of vehicles like off-road vehicles,
planes, boats, and so on. They have to issue standards for stationary
sources, including, for example, under the PSD provisions, the prevention
of significant deterioration provisions. They probably, absent some really
creative reading of the relevant Clean Air Act provisions, have to set
nationally ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act, and
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for those of you know something about the Clean Air Act, you already
know how crazy that is.
For those of you who don't, basically the idea is this under the
Clean Air Act, we set air quality standards that every metropolitan area
has to meet. The idea is that Washington, DC has to worry about getting
the smog to below a certain level and New York has to do this and Phoenix
and so on, and that each metropolitan area is doing this essentially on its
own or on a regional basis through the state government. And the states
have to issue state implementation plans saying how they're going to meet
the standards. And if they don't, they lose their highway funds and the
federal government will do it for them.
It makes sense when you're talking about localized pollutants. It
makes sense when you're talking about the sorts of pollutants that the
Clean Air Act was actually written to deal with. It doesn't make sense
when you're talking about substances that are globally disbursed. We can't
meaningfully talk about greenhouse gas concentrations in Washington,
DC being meaningfully different than in Boise, Idaho, Los Angeles,
California, or Shanghai. But yet, that is what the Act require. Thus, it
was, in some respects, a brilliant strategic move that the petitioners in
Massachusetts v. EPA, some of whom had filed a parallel suit in federal
court to require the setting of a national ambient air quality standard
under the Clean Air Act, took a voluntary dismissal of that case before
Massachusetts v. EPA was argued before the Supreme Court, so they could
honestly say to the Supreme Court when presented with this crazy
scenario as an argument for why the Clean Air Act didn't apply, they could
say, oh, but Your Honor, there is no such case pending; no one is filing
a case right now or is pressing the claim that such standards have to be
adopted. And at that moment they were correct. But under the holding
of Massachusetts v. EPA and under the Clean Air Act that is required.
Here are some other practical impacts of this. If you just look at
the Prevention for the Significant Deterioration provisions of the Clean
Air Act, these deal typically what we think of as large industrial facilities.
There are somewhere around 200 to 300 such facilities that have to go
through PSD permitting right now. PSD permitting is only imposed on
major sources that emit a minimum amount of tons of the relevant
pollutant per year. But given that, the relevant facilities tend to emit
carbon dioxide in much greater volume than other pollutants, we will see,
once it is applied to PSD (and just a couple weeks ago, the Environmental
Appeals Board of the EPA remanded a PSD permit for its failure to
address carbon dioxide emissions), we will see not 200 to 300 facilities that
[Vol. 33:549560
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have to deal with PSD permitting, but two to three thousand. So,just that
one tiny slice of the Clean Air Act, we're going to see a tenfold increase
in the permitting requirements.
Now, it's not just the Clean Air Act. I have more good news.
Recently the Fish and Wildlife Service listed the polar bear as a
threatened species under the Endangered Species Act. Now, I will take
what may be the unpopular position in this crowd to say that under the
law, I think the Fish and Wildlife Service had no choice. The short answer
for why that is, is the Endangered Species Act requires you to use the best
available science. While we know as a near metaphysical certainty polar
bears at prior times, such as the last interglacial warm period, somehow
managed to survive absent arctic ice, there were no scientists there to
document those findings. There are no studies showing us how they did
it. Therefore, we have no science about how they survived, and the only
science we have on polar bears and arctic sea ice seems to suggest quite
strongly that less arctic sea ice is much worse for polar bears.
Now, what is this going to do? It's going to do a lot of things, none
of which are particularly good for polar bears. Among other things, it will
effectively de-fund the most important conservation-through-use program
for polar bears that exists in the world. But another one of the things it
will do is require consultation for the effects of carbon dioxide emissions
and greenhouse gas emissions for all significant federal actions, or all
significant actions that are undertaken, authorized or funded by the
federal government under Section 7 of the ESA.
Now these projects will go through because once the consultation
process begins, the judgment of the Fish and Wildlife Service will be that
the marginal impact of each project isn't all so great. But that's not the
standard of the Act. That's not the standard that the courts have applied
in terms of the threshold consultation requirement. And as folks at the
Fish and Wildlife Service will tell you, they do not have the personnel,
they do not have the resources, to come anywhere close to engaging in all
the required consultations that the polar bear listing-and the additional
listings that are soon coming (there's something like eight or ten species
that additional petitions have been filed for that will be listed for the same
reasons as the polar bear). The Fish and Wildlife Service has no ability
to do these consultations, but they will be required.
The Bush administration is currently working on a rule to try and
completely rewrite Section 7 regulations. It's in some respects an admirable
effort to try and avoid a true regulatory train wreck. It is an effort that
will fail, and it would fail even if the Obama administration was intending
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to leave these rules, when they're finally issued, intact. I don't think, given
the way the courts have interpreted Section 7, these regulatory provisions
have a prayer of being upheld. So, we have another regularity train wreck
in the offing by doing nothing.
So, that creates a situation where, like it or not, the discussion over
climate change right now is not do we do something or do we do nothing.
It's, what do we do? Because sitting on our hands results in a massive
amount of regulation going forward. And I think it's quite clear in the
current Congress-I heard just this morning that Henry Waxman will
upset John Dingell as chairman of the Energy and Commerce Commit-
tee-the question is what, given this legislature, could be produced that
would be preferable to what we're going to see under these Acts. Is it a
cap-and-trade system like that advocated by John McCain and Barack
Obama during the campaign? Is it a carbon tax that a lot of my economist
friends think would be preferable and I think would be preferable to a cap-
and-trade system? Or is it something else? And if we implemented it,
would we ever let it actually be enforced?
I'm pretty sure that I'm about out of time, so let me just say one
last thing. I think that some of the data that Steve's presentation earlier
shows that we have no clue how to reduce emissions to a level that would,
in the words of the IPCC, avoid dangerous levels, or what they consider
to be dangerous levels, of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. We have
no clue how to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions in the near to medium
term. The sorts of technologies that are required are things aren't even
yet dreamt of. Even if we did everything that John suggested, we don't
come close to Obama's targets, let alone the targets that would be actually
necessary to stabilize the concentrations to the levels talked about.
And on top of that, in our current economic situation, it's not as
if the federal government's going to start writing lots of checks to subsidize
lots of new R&D in this area. And I would say even if they did, it's not as
if that sort of R&D would produce much. We've been spending millions,
or actually billions, of dollars on R&D for alternative energy sources over
the last fifty years and have precious little to show for it, particularly if
we're interested in commercially viable technologies.
But there are some sorts of other things we should look at, and I'm
just going to mention one and then turn the mic over to Jeremy. It was,
in my view, probably the only good idea on energy policy we heard from
either major candidate during the campaign. So as a consequence, it was
mentioned once in a speech, put at the very end of a list of talking points,
and then never heard from again. And what that idea was, was the idea
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of a prize for innovation. Say, instead of picking out labs and picking
winners and losers and throwing subsidies at people, we're going to say
instead there are innovations, there are ideas, there are solutions we
really, really need, and we have no clue how to get there.
But we figure if we hold out the possibility of a big enough reward
that maybe somebody out there, somebody who's not already in a federal
lab, somebody's who's not already at the Federal trough, might actually
be able to do it. When the British Empire wanted to improve navigation,
this is what they did, and the guy that won the prize was someone that
never would've gotten a grant from the Crown because his ideas were seen
as so ludicrous before he proved them.
The virtues of prizes are many. I'm just going to mention a couple.
The first is, you don't spend the money until you actually have something
in return, something that federal subsidy programs typically can't claim.
The second is you are spurring more innovation than you're actually
spending. When some private entrepreneurs underwrote the Ansari X Prize
for feasible manned repeatable space travel, they offered a $10 million prize
and spurred over $100 million in private investment that produced all sorts
of entrepreneurial innovation that we would not have seen otherwise.
Prizes aren't subject to the same sort of rent seeking and special-
interest money grubbing that we typically see in the subsidy process,
which is certainly another benefit. And another benefit is something that
we see in operation all the time. The principle behind using prizes is the
same principle that underlies our patent system. The idea is that
sometimes, for whatever reason, we don't think the market by itself is
going to produce the type of innovation we want, so we will offer to people
a super-competitive reward for achieving something. That's what a patent
effectively does, giving an innovator monopoly rents for a period of time.
A prize will give you the same thing.
So, if it were up to me and I was trying to come up with one big
idea, something to do while we try and avoid all the crazy things that
we're in the process of doing now, I would say why don't we take the net
present value of all the energy R&D we're planning on spending in the
next 10 years and divvy it up into a handful of prizes for a handful of
innovations that we really need, things that are transformative, and
maybe that would help us figure out how to do some of these things in a
less costly and a less ridiculous way.
Thank you.
(Applause.)
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All the previous speakers have focused on public policy. But the
sponsoring organization here has "Law" as well as "Public Policy" in its
name. I want to talk about law-specifically, the implications for
constitutional law in efforts to implement a successor treaty to Kyoto.
In the interest of full disclosure, I will concede that I agree entirely
with Steve Hayward that no foreseeable international regulatory effort
will have any actual effect on the earth's climate. I do not think it is
possible for the United States and Europe to cut their carbon dioxide
emissions-in effect, to hold their collective breaths-sufficiently to affect
actual CO2 levels in the atmosphere. To do that, we'd have to get China
to hold its breath, too. And India. And the rest of the world. I think it is
safe to say that's not going to happen.
But I disagree with Steve's suggestion that since the ultimate goal
can't be achieved, no attempt will be made to achieve it. Alas, that's not
how the world works. We have been hearing for decades that European
integration faces insurmountable obstacles, that the latest treaty in this
area will be the last one, that it can't go forward because its aim is not
really accepted by most Europeans. Somehow, the rejection of European
treaties by actual voters doesn't stop the attempt to go forward with new
treaties. Bad ideas have their hour, even impossible ideas seem to have
their hour. Or their decade. So, I think it's almost certain that some
ambitious new things will be attempted, and I just want to focus you
briefly on some constitutional challenges which they will present to us.
[So, wherever we end up in this effort to halt climate change, I
don't think we are about to abandon the whole effort any time soon. What
I do think we will see is an effort to attempt something more ambitious
in the successor to Kyoto. In particular, I think there will be much more
effort in the next treaty, compared with the Kyoto Protocol, to link the
obligations of individual countries to the climate control measures
undertaken by other countries. That will be logical, since increases in
carbon emissions by some countries would otherwise nullify the benefits
supposed to be achieved by the sacrifices of others. But apart from its
policy logic, such linkages will be politically irresistible in an era when
so many countries are experiencing economic downturns and governments
are under great pressure to assure that their people are not placed at a
competitive disadvantage.]
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[Even the Kyoto Protocol tried to establish certain linkages in the
name of flexibility. There were provisions for buying and selling emission
rights, between countries exceeding their limits and countries not
exceeding their agreed limits. In other words, there was provision for an
international counterpart to the cap-and-trade programs the EPA has
administered for sulfur-dioxide and some other pollutants within the
United States. There was also provision for satisfying emission reduction
targets by arranging for alternate reductions in less developed countries
(countries not otherwise committed by Kyoto reduction targets). The idea
was that reductions achievable at lower cost in less developed economies
could take the place of measures that would otherwise be very costly in
a developed economy. Finally, there were provisions for off-setting carbon
emissions with measures to soak up more carbon dioxide, such as
increasing the size of forests that could serve as "carbon sinks."]
[The point to notice about all these measures is that they require
a great deal of coordination, which in turn requires a great deal of
specification and precision, if these measures are to work as intended. We
aren'tjust asking everyone to do their best to reduce their own emissions.
We are authorizing emission increases in some places with the idea that
they will be compensated by decreases elsewhere. How can we be sure that
a country selling emission rights is properly calculating its own emission
levels-that it is selling no more than it should be allowed to sell, given
its own production trends and its own past record of emissions? How can
we be sure that a developing country, which agrees to adapt new
technology as an offset for some other country's emission increases, isn't
doing what it would have done anyway? What technological improvements
in developing countries (as for example, switching from coal burning
plants to less polluting fuel sources) should be allowed as off-sets and
what should be considered expected base-line trends? Does it matter
whether the developed country's economy is growing in other areas? Does
the rate of growth matter? How do we calculate the carbon storage
capacity of trees? Should we give different credits for trees of different
species or different age, for trees planted at different elevations or
different latitudes? All these variables do affect the carbon storage
capacity of trees.]
[We didn't get very far in elaborating these measures in Kyoto. I
think it is quite clear that we won't be able to settle all these questions
in a follow-on treaty. There are innumerable details which will have to
be delegated to specialized agencies, which can re-adjust standards in
light of new experience and new data. That will mean a great deal of
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international regulatory infrastructure on a scale that is totally beyond
anything we've ever seen before. And this will present constitutional
problems, very serious problems.]
The problem I want to focus on here is the challenge to various
aspects of the non-delegation doctrine. Suppose we have a new treaty
which is ratified by the Senate. Then there are these regulatory add-ons.
These are administrative elaborations of more general provisions in the
treaty. What is their legal status?
We have already had a foretaste of the constitutional controversies
that are brewing here. The Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting
Substances is a much more modest treaty than Kyoto -and of course far
more modest than the post-Kyoto treaty on climate change. The Montreal
Protocol does not cover all use of fossil fuels but simply focuses on a small
number of specialized chemicals. Still, there was uncertainty about how
quickly to phase out the use of covered chemicals like chlorofluorocarbons
("CFCs"), methyl bromide and some other substances. The experts kept
changing their calculations and recommendations and there were
successive meetings of the states-party to revise the previously agreed
reduction schedules. The treaty authorized changes by two-thirds vote
of the parties.
A case came before the D.C. Court of Appeals in 2005 called
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA. The NRDC complained that
the EPA had failed to implement the latest ratchet of reduction that had
been agreed by the parties in a diplomatic conference. The DC Court of
Appeals held that U.S. law did not require the EPA to implement such
a diplomatic agreement. The Court said it did not think Congress had
intended the EPA to be bound by votes at international gatherings of this
sort.
[In fact, the court went a little further than that. The judges
acknowledged that Congress might have intended to bind the EPA to
international agreements in this way, because the amendments to the
Clean Air Act had made reference to international standards. But reading
the statute this way, the court explained, would raise very serious
constitutional problems. It would mean delegating the treaty power to an
international gathering, so international commitments of the United
States, instead of being made by the President and two-thirds of the
Senate, could be made by a gathering of foreign governments in which the
United States had actually opposed the result but been outvoted by
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two-thirds of the other governments. Or, the statute might be read as
delegating not the power to make treaty commitments but the power to
make U.S. legislation directly. That might seem to follow if the EPA were
bound by a vote of an international conference in the same way it would
be bound by an actual vote of the U.S. Congress.]
[There is not yet a Supreme Court decision addressing this
question. The DC Court ruling noted that the Supreme Court might have
faced similar questions in litigation over the effect of international court
rulings on capital punishment cases in American courts. In its 2005
ruling, the DC Court of Appeals noted that none of these cases had
received a full hearing from the Supreme Court.]
[Well, last spring, in Medellin v. Texas, the Supreme Court finally
did address this issue. The International Court of Justice had held that
Texas denied Medellin rights he was guaranteed under the convention
on consular relations-a treaty which the U.S. has ratified. The ICJ held
that the execution of Medellin, in these circumstances, would violate U.S.
treaty obligations, so the International Court ordered the U.S. not to allow
the execution to go forward. President Bush accepted the Court's claim
about U.S. obligations and tried to direct Texas to rescind its capital
sentence. But Texas courts denied the president's authority to intervene.]
[The U.S. Supreme Court held that ratifying the treaty on consular
relations did not commit the United States to interpret the treaty as the
International Court of Justice might advise. Not even the U.S. ratification
of a protocol to that treaty, allowing disputes about its interpretation to
be brought to the ICJ, committed the United States to give direct force
to ICJ rulings in American domestic law. So the president could not insist
that a state court obey the ruling of the ICJ.I
[The Supreme Court's Medellin ruling was not unanimous. Three
dissenters argued that Texas courts should be required to obey the
directive of the ICJ, because the treaty authorizing appeals of disputes
to the ICJ implicitly directed American courts to give direct effect in U.S.
law to interpretations of the international court. The Court's majority held
that the Senate, when it ratified this treaty, had not indicated that it
intended to give direct effect to ICJ rulings in this area. But the majority
did not say the Senate could not have authorized ICJ rulings to have
direct effect. Justice Stevens emphasized, in a concurring opinion, that
he was persuaded that this particular treaty did not authorize giving
direct effect to ICJ rulings but another treaty might rightly be interpreted
otherwise.]
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[So at least one and perhaps more than one of the justices voting
with the majority in Medellin remains open to the idea embraced by the
dissenters-that a treaty might authorize an international entity to
elaborate on the terms of a U.S. treaty commitment, after the Senate has
ratified that commitment. There may well be a majority of justices
prepared to say it is constitutional for a treaty to lay down certain general
principles and then set up an international mechanism to refine and
elaborate more detailed standards-and make these standards binding
in U.S. law, without returning to the Senate to ratify the new interna-
tional standard and without returning to Congress for new legislation to
enact these elaborations into U.S. law.]
[Just over the horizon, then, there are big constitutional disputes
in prospect. We are likely to see elaborate regulatory structures
established under a post-Kyoto treaty. We are likely to see interest groups
within the United States eager to influence decisions coming out of those
international agencies or international forums and then insisting that
favorable results be applied in American law. There will be a lot of money
at stake, whether the new standards go this way or that way. And
American courts will not be quite clear on when the international
standard binds U.S. regulatory agencies. Does a new international
standard require separate ratification by two-thirds of the Sen-
ate-always? Does a new international standard have to be separately
embraced by implementing legislation that has been approved, in the
normal way, by requisite majorities in the House and the Senate? If a
treaty can authorize an international entity to make binding regulations,
would the U.S. still be bound if U.S. diplomats had opposed these
regulations? What if the President refused to endorse such regulations
in international negotiations: could Congress direct U.S. administrators
to implement them over the president's objections?]
[The constitutional disputes won'tjust be about who gets to control
the elaboration of technical standards for particular environmental
measures. Ultimately, the issue is whether the Constitution does set
limits on the possibilities for changing our structure of government by
mere treaty. This is now one of the fundamental differences between the
American approach to international law and the approach taken by
nations of the European Union. At least within the EU, European states
accept the idea that a treaty can authorize an international authority to
make new rules, not subject to approval by the national government.
Within the European Union, new regulations are made by the European
Commission, a free-standing administrative body or by the Council of
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Ministers, which represents the member states. But either way, in most
areas, a nation can be bound by a new standard to which its own
government (or its own minister on the Council) had previously objected.
The United States does not now participate in international treaties
involving such wholesale delegation of legislative powers.]
[A few years ago, The Economist magazine asked government
officials in various EU nations how much of the law they enforced was law
made for them at the European level. Answers varied but most of those
surveyed said something like half or more than half the law they enforced
was made at the European level. So European states have established a
whole new government, on top of the parliamentary structures set out in
their own national constitutions. And the new government has been
established simply by treaties-the treaties delegating powers to the EU.]
[Now, if the United States does enter into a post-Kyoto treaty
seeking to control climate change, that treaty will generate a whole lot
of international regulation. It won't just be setting standards in a few very
technical matters but implementing standards for energy use across our
entire economy. If these standards can be made by international
administrative agencies or by international diplomatic gatherings, we are
talking about a very large transfer of political authority from our own
government to international councils.]
Perhaps you think this could not happen and regard the whole
prospect as simply too fantastic to contemplate .... Let me answer with
a saying of Aristotle: "What has happened, can happen."
Thank you.
(Applause.)
JUDGE SUTTON
Thank you. We've got some time for questions. As the moderator,
I'd like to exercise the prerogative to start with the first one, and I hope
we'll get some questions on law, but I did want to start with one on policy.
John, I was going to ask you to respond initially, and perhaps one or two
others might have an answer. Most elected officials that I'm familiar with,
whether they're governors or presidents, seem to care about economic
growth, unemployment rates and the like. And my question is the extent
to which these responses to climate change realistically can deal with
those political ambitions. When I think of the news coverage recently
about the plight of the American car companies, including the possibility
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of bankruptcy filings, no elected official to my knowledge has said that
the demise of some car companies would be good for the environment.
So, John you talked about conservation, and clearly that's
important. I mean one great form of conservation, of course, is a ten-year
recession. That will decrease a lot of these emissions and other problems.
But that can't politically be the answer. So, what does an elected official
do to deal with these concerns in a realistic way?
PROFESSOR DERNBACH
Well, it's a really good question, and obviously it's really timely.
I'm going to give you a perspective from the state level, where, as the
judge indicated, I've spent about half my career. The energy issue in
Pennsylvania in the last six years has been cast not as a climate change
issue. It's been cast as a job creation issue, as about fostering the
development of new technology; it's about making Pennsylvania a center
for energy innovation for part of the next century. Our former secretary
of environmental protection, with the support of our current governor,
went to Spain and convinced a Spanish wind turbine manufacturer,
Gamesa, to locate its North American manufacturing headquarters in
Pennsylvania.
Now this, folks, is good old-fashioned economic development.
Pennsylvania used the standard tools that states have been using for a
long time to attract industry. And we have something like 4000 new
manufacturing jobs. A lot of steelworkers from the Pittsburgh area are
now making wind turbines. This issue has been cast mostly as one that's
about job creation, technology, reducing other pollution, making the state
attractive in a lot of other ways and, oh, by the way, addressing climate
change.
That's a common way that climate change has been addressed at
the state level. I was in Ann Arbor six weeks ago, listening to Governor
Jennifer Granholm express the same aspiration for Michigan, using the
car manufacturers as an example. She's doing the same thing that
Governor Ed Rendell is doing in Pennsylvania. I've heard the same thing
from other governors. This conversation is different from the conversation
that we've often had at the national level.
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PROFESSOR ADLER
Quickly, two things. One, I think what John alludes to is an
important thing to recognize about what we're seeing at the state level,
which is, with the exception of California, state climate policies generally
fit into one of two categories. One is the purely symbolic; that is,
aspirations, creating cabinet-level committees and so on, but nothing that
actually pinches in an economically meaningful way. Or, policies that can,
at the right time, be characterized as climate policies but are really about
something else. You know, they are energy or industrial policies that are
given this kind of green gloss.
As for those, the policies that fit in the second category, whether
or not one finds the argument that state-driven environmental investment
is going to create jobs and produce all these other benefits really is a
question of whether or not one believes that state-driven industrial policy
as a general matter is an effective way of increasing growth, increasing
wages, increasing jobs and so on. I happen to be one who thinks it's not.
I happen to think you get the broken window fallacy, and you certainly
see the winners of when you get a new plant sited, but overall, the
economies of the states that spend all their time trying to pick winners
and losers don't end up doing better.
I think the economic literature is pretty robust on that point, and
it's not an environmental or non-environmental thing. It's just that state
governments, like all governments, aren't particularly good at using
industrial policy as a way of promoting economic development.
DR. HAYWARD
Can I make a quick observation, Judge,just as a historical matter?
I went once and looked quite carefully at the energy consumption data
from the Great Depression because you mentioned that one way to
reduce/conserve is to have a depression. Of course, consumption went way
down of energy and everything else. Energy efficiency went in reverse for
commonsense reasons if you think about it for 10 seconds, and it's not
clear to me today we're that much smarter that we can reverse the overall
phenomenon that represents of diminished capital expenditures, people
not trading up for better boilers in industrial settings or in their home
appliances.
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AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT
I'm Kai Alberg. Where I live in Western Washington, in a few years
two dams will be removed pursuant to federal legislation to restore salmon
runs and protect the endangered salmon. This will cause about an
additional 70,000 tons a year of CO2 to be admitted by other power plants
that will pick up the slack. And instead, in Oregon there's a much bigger
effort to deny re-permitting for some dams that are currently producing
power for about 700,000 consumers. Eventually, I would expect this
conflict between endangered species legislation taking out clean power,
hydro dams, and the Clean Air Act, and the pursuit of reducing CO 2
omissions will wind up in front of a court somewhere.
I'd like to ask the panelists how they think a judge will or ought
to analyze those issues when they come in front of the court.
PROFESSOR ADLER
I would say they should follow the law, which in many cases means
doing things that, in light of these statutes, that don't make a lot of sense.
I mean, right now there's nothing in the Clean Air Act that would preclude
the removal of these dams, and if they are legally required based on other
agreements that have been made, then they're going to go forward with that.
But I would note, this conflict between different environmental
values in the economics of energy aren't new to climate change. In hydro,
we see them in a quite pointed way, but we see them with all sorts of
alternative energy sources because the reality is, there is no source of
energy that is free of environmental impacts. And so, it turns out that
those that happen to be less carbon-intensive have other impacts. With
hydro, it's affecting rivers and streams. With wind power, it's, certainly
with older types of wind turbines, there's the problem of bird kills. With
newer ones, it's the problem of, in the words of RFK Jr., despoiling the
water wilderness offthe coast of Massachusetts should wind farms be built.
But you know, there are all these trade-offs, and our existing legal
structure makes it very difficult to actually deal with those trade-offs in
a reasonable way. So for example, with the Cape Wind Project and other
offshore wind development proposals, the permitting process creates lots
of opportunities to simply throw up roadblocks and prevent any
development at all, but it doesn't create really any opportunity for an
agency, let alone the public, to engage in any sort of discussion about what
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sort of trade-offs we are or are not willing to make to meet one set of
environmental goals versus another, and that's just one of the pathologies
that are existing in the environmental laws that are given us.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT
Yes, thank you. My name is Buddy Menton from the New York
chapter. I think there's on the order of five billion people in the world now
who are outside, essentially, the energy economy-don't have electricity,
don't have cars, don't have home heat, etc. They haven't caught up with
the level of standard of living that we have. And the question I have is
are those people to be allowed to join our standard of living or are they
to be locked into poverty forever? I think that if we could double the
energy efficiency of the United States, we couldn't come near to the energy
saving that would be necessary to bring those people up to our standard
of living, even if they had double the efficiency that we have. So, how is
this to be done? And isn't that really a more important moral issue than
saving the coastal property of a Hamptons millionaire?
(Applause.)
PROFESSOR DERNBACH
Ifwe don't do anything about greenhouse gas emissions in the United
States or anywhere else, we're going to continue to drive those people even
further into poverty. That's the short answer, and that's the truth.
Now, there's more-
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT
Do you have a basis for saying that?
PROFESSOR DERNBACH
Yes, I do. There's a lot of science that climate change is already
adversely affecting, and will continue to adversely affect, the people who
have the least ability to adapt. We can buy air conditioners, but in a lot
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of places you can't do that. The IPCC reports all say as you continue to
push greenhouse gas emissions up, you get higher and higher levels of
greenhouse gas concentrations all around the world, and the people who
are going to be most adversely affected are the poor.
The federal climate bills pretty much all say that we should
significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions over the next forty-some
years, by 2050. There's an interesting question about projects like that.
If you know the first group of things that you really need to do, but you
don't know what to do after that, do you start now anyway with the
expectation that in five or ten years, you'll have a little better idea of what
the next steps ought to be? Or, do you say, well, we don't know how to get
all the way to 2050 from here, and so we're not going to start?
I prefer the first approach for a couple of reasons. One is, we've
done it before. We did it when we declared war on Germany and Japan
in World War II. We did it when we said we'd send a man to the moon by
the end of the 1960s. This is America, right? We do things that are
important to do, knowing in advance that there is a risk we might fail but
knowing that the goal is worth achieving. And it's worth achieving, by the
way, not just for its own sake, not just because of climate change; there
are many other benefits we get as well.
I don't think you get there by doubling energy efficiency; I think
you get there by increasing the efficiency with which we use energy by
one or two orders of magnitude. And I think that's doable. It's doable if
we put our minds to it.
PROFESSOR ADLER
I think the flip side of what John said that we have to think about
is that so much of our energy is a function of capital stock and infrastruc-
ture and things that we don't buy year-to-year, or even decade by decade.
So, decisions we-so if we rush to do our first little step now, we may be
locking in certain types of capital stock for 20, 30, 40, 50 years. And in
many cases, waiting will actually be that much easier and that much
cheaper to produce greater reductions later. We've seen this in a whole
bunch of areas, certainly in the telecom area, that when something comes
along that is that much cheaper and that much more efficient, the market
doesn't need a lot of help to change over very, very quickly. The key is to
have that innovation that actually is the leap forward instead of the tiny
step forward.
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On the other point is a quick little thought experiment.
Assume-and I think John's right on this-that the most likely effects of
climate change are far worse on tropical parts of the world than temperate
parts of the world, far worse on poor or less developed nations than the
United States. For those that are interested, AEI did a monograph several
years ago by Robert Mendelsohn from Yale. I think it's called something
like The Greening of Global Warming. It summarizes the economic and
climate literature on this, and the basic bottom line answers aren't really
any different, that under any reasonable scenario, countries like
Bangladesh lose.
So then the question is if they have the choice, would they rather
us figure out how to reduce our emissions when a lot of the effects that
we're talking about are locked into the system and are unavoidable and
are mixed in with other things that are going on in the world anyway, or
would they rather us indemnify them, compensate them, you know, help
them be more like the Dutch and build dykes so they don't have to worry
about flooding and so on? I don't think there's any question what they
would choose, and I don't think there's any question what is orders of
magnitude cheaper over the next, say, thirty to fifty years.
So, if our concern is a moral one-I think John's correct to raise
that issue; I've written a paper saying that a lot of folks on the right
haven't given this part of climate change enough thought-the answer
is probably not short to medium-term efforts to reduce emissions because
that's not going to enhance welfare in developing nations, and it's going
to be less efficient, and it's not what they would have wanted if we'd given
them the choice.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT
The reason I came forward was I was disappointed that no one on
the panel challenged the premise of man-made global warming. There are
thousands of scientists who do. The notion of consensus, Mr. Dernbach,
I think flies in the face of that. Thousands of scientists have signed
petitions suggesting that they dispute the notion. And personally, the
notion that a natural chemical substance that makes up only 370 parts
per million of our atmosphere gives us control over climate is preposter-
ous. Thank you.
(Applause.)
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DR. HAYWARD
Look, this is-here, I disagree with John to this extent. I think
there is a robust argument over how much. I mean, the basic theory that
greenhouse gases trap heat, that is a pretty sound theory. But the
question is, is it one degree or four degrees, even I can give you citations
from the IPCC reports on this.
However, I've reached a state of repose about this. As badly
politicized as science is, it is an iterative process. And with past problems
that we have overestimated-not problems that were wrong but that we
mis-estimated or overestimated-I think that if the skeptical case is right,
that is going to be born out in the fullness of time, and so I'm perfectly
happy to wait and sit back and let that process take its way. And by the
way, successive iterations of the IPCC, if they get better at it, then they
will be borne out by the evidence.
I mean, the one thing that seems a problem for me right now,
socially you might say, is that global temperatures have been flat for the
last seven or eight years, and this year's going to come in about the coldest
year in thirty years. I guarantee the New York Times headline in January
will say, "Coldest Year in 30 Years, but We're All Still Doomed." Now, it
may be perfectly consistent with the catastrophic case. Some of the
European modelers have said it's ocean currents; it's temporary. But
when, like Al Gore, you have made the arrival, the two-day early arrival
of every cock robin in the spring a harbinger of imminent catastrophe and
suddenly you get a few cold years, that causes them a big problem, and
I think you're going to see that play out in the next three or four years.
That's my sort of 50% probability, yes, about the matter.
PROFESSOR DERNBACH
Just a couple of quick things on that. A lot of the scientists who
have been weighing in on the other side are actually not climate scientists,
and that's a serious concern. And if you go to five doctors and four of them
tell you you've got a problem and one of them doesn't, what do you do? Do
you decide who you're going to listen to and walk away, or do you do
something prudent?
Climate change is not like whether there's a tooth fairy or whether
there's Santa Claus-where you can just believe it or not and it doesn't
matter. What we're doing, for real, is putting greenhouse gases into the
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atmosphere. And we are, for real, creating serious risks of both short- and
long-term problems, some of which are now being borne out.
I'm a career environmental lawyer. In my experience, there's a
question about what the risk is, and you try to assess that. And then
there's a separate risk management question. And the risk management
question is, what does a prudent society to do in the face of abundant
evidence on climate change? That's not a question that you can simply say
"yes" or "no" to. In my experience as a problem solver, you look for
prudent, appropriate things to do.
PROFESSOR ADLER
I actually agree with both John and Steve on this point, and let
me say why. If you look at the people that are held up as skeptics-and
in a recent paper I did this, I used only sources that would be character-
ized as skeptical, you know, so Pat Michaels, Roy Spencer, Bob Balling,
and so on-do you find them claiming that human activity has no effect
on the climate? No, you do not. Do you find them saying that existing and
projected emissions of greenhouse gases will not affect temperature, will
not warm the earth, all else equal? No, you do not. Do you find them
saying there will be no sea level rise? No, you do not.
You find them saying that the changes in climate will be much less
than, say, Steven Schneider says or James Hanson says. You find them
saying that the effect on the sea level will be much less and much closer
to the background noise, but you don't see them saying zero. Dick Lindzen
at MIT, who, in terms of his estimate of the climate responses in the
atmosphere is at the low end of people that are really actively involved,
still doesn't say zero. So, the people that are skeptics aren't skeptical of
the underlying mechanisms; they're skeptical about whether the world's
going to end.
But the other point is that the debate really isn't over whether or
not the world's going to end. The debate is over whether or not, ifwe believe
and have good reason to believe that certain effects are going to happen,
what do or don't we do about them. I think that is a policy debate that we
have to have given uncertainty, because we have uncertainty in every
heavily science-dependent question. And secondly, we also have to stop
pretending-this isn't a right or left thing; this is a pathology that is
endemic to environmental policy generally and is, in some cases, written
into our laws-we have to stop pretending that answering the scientific
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question with a particular level of certainty answers the policy question be-
cause the policy question is always a normative question and the science ques-
tion is a positive question. And the answer to a scientific question will inform
our normative judgment, but it cannot and should not ever dictate it.
And too often in this debate, as in others, we pretend as if, oh, once
we get the science right, we know the answer. Well, no, we don't; we just
have a different baseline for our debate.
PROF. RABKIN
Let me just give an illustration of that.
Everyone is saying, who wants to do something dramatic about
global warming, that fifty years or eighty years or a hundred years from
now, it could be really, really hard on Bangladesh, which-you know, I'm
sorry for Bangladesh, but eighty or a hundred years is a fairly long
planning horizon. What's it going to be for countries near Iran when they
get nuclear weapons next year or the year after? I think worse conse-
quences than flooding even. And this is something we've been living with
since 1945. People said, after Hiroshima, this is so scary, this is beyond
anything we've ever experienced, which it was. And so, people said it's
obvious that we need world governments to deal with it because only
world government can deal with the challenge of nuclear war, which is
so terrible, that it's worth any risk. Well, actually no. It turned out no
government in the world was prepared to say that, except for Luxembourg,
which just had to be satisfied with the EU.
(Laughter.)
PROFESSOR RABKIN
The fact that you hold up to us something which is a frightening
possibility doesn't mean that we suspend all judgment, go into a swoon,
and say that's so scary, that we're putting you in charge of the world. Take
it from here. And I do think that is really what's being said when people
say let's start on this process which will, in the next three decades, have
us not just cut our energy use by half but by orders of magnitude. Let's
look forward to a day within, within a period in which the young members
of the Federalist Society will still be with us, in which they will be using
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one-tenth as much energy as today. And you really have to say, are you
serious? Are you serious?
And if you are serious about America, which is, after all, a rich
country-probably, we have ten times more than we need-that was an
excellent question about the third world. I mean, China is not going to
do this, period. This is not hypothetical. They said at Kyoto our answer
is the three No's: No, we will not do it now; no, we will not do it later; no,
we will not do it ever. And so, what we're really talking about is let's have
a confrontation with China over this because the fate of the earth is at
stake, and since the fate of the earth is at stake, it's really worthwhile
having a confrontation with nuclear China over forcing them to remain
at a very low level of development. And I say, wait a minute; what about
Iran that's getting the bomb next year? Couldn't we handle that one first?
No, that's just a passing problem. That's just like a minor thing right now.
I mean, people choose the horror that they like to focus on, but my
taste is let's focus on manageable things that are near at hand rather than
remove things which we really have no, with present technology and
present prospects, any way of dealing with it.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT
Wow. Okay, you put me right off my game. Steven, James Hanson
has the answer for cold years. That's to use September's data for October,
and on both the state and federal action questions, I think you both had
interesting points, but I'm thinking on the federal level, you talked about
the clash between the Clean Air Act and the Endangered Species Act.
What happens when, in essence, a self-appointed trustee for the polar bear
attacks a self-appointed trustee for the salmon? That is a kind of maybe
a more interesting question.
PROFESSOR ADLER
Yeah, the short answer is that the effect of what's going on under
the ESA is not going to be to force anybody to do anything other than to
force the Agency to spend a lot of time and energy and resources that it
doesn't have studying something to just effectively grind things to a halt
so whatever the status quo is will be preserved.
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JUDGE SUTTON
Thank you so much for coming. Let's give a hand for our speakers.
(Applause.)
(Panel concluded.)
